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I. INTRODUCTION
You are in the privacy of your home, relaxing after a long day at
work. Suddenly you hear a knock at the door. "Who is it?" you ask.
The man behind the door responds by saying he has a package for
you. You see no need to be alarmed, so you slowly open the door,
curious about the contents of the package. As soon as you open the
door, the man pushes you to the floor, starts ripping off your clothes
and rapes you. According to this guy, you asked for it. "Honestly,"
he says, "I was following the directions you posted on the Internet!"
While such a scenario seems far-fetched, it happens more often
than we think In fact, this story is based on a real case in California.'
SB.A, Telecommunications, Indiana University, 1997; J.D. Candidate, Santa Clara University
School of Law, 2001.
'See Gina Keating, Man Gets Maximum Sentence For Cyber StalAing of Woman He Met at
Church, Crry NEWS SERVICE, July 22, 1999, arailable at LEXIS, News Library, City Nevw
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For months, several men visited a 28-year old California woman and
.2attempted to carry out the above scenario. The perpetrators all later
claimed they had seen her name, phone number and address on the
Internet prompting them to go to her home seeking sexual relations.
Six men came to the victim's apartment.4 Some claimed they had
seen "steamy e-mails" sent in her name.5 One message read: "Tell me
you have a package, and when I open my door, attack me. Tie me,
gag me, rip off my clothes and go for it. I'll struggle a little just for
the fun of it ....
The Internet postings were later discovered to have originated
from a man whom the victim had previously met and later rejected.7
The man, later identified as Gary S. Dellapenta, was apprehended and
given the maximum sentence for the crime.8 Ironically, Dellapenta's
victim did not have Internet access in her home. 9 For sometime, she
did not even know why the men were targeting her.'0 Eventually, the
victim's father contacted her stalker posing as someone interested in
the elaborate rape fantasy.' This action, along with the help of a
police investigation, led to Dellapenta's arrest.12  In April 1999
Dellapenta pled guilty to three counts of solicitation for sexual assault
and one count of stalking. 13 The judge sentenced him to six years in
state prison, stating "to give him anything less is insufficient to
protect society."
14
In another real-life situation, a woman found a message posted on
the Internet, listing her home phone number, her address and a
message that read "[she] was available for sex anytime of the day or
Service File.21d.
' See id.41d.
5Id.
6id.
7 Keating, supra note 1.
'See id.
' See id.
1Id.
1 See id.12 id.
13 Keating, supra note 1.
14 Id. Television dramas tend to mimic news stories like this one. For example, in an episode of
the television show Nash Bridges, one of the female characters experienced a similar encounter.
Nash Bridges: Vendetta (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 23, 1999). However, the show differed
in that the victim not only knew her stalker, but was the detective who had helped send the
stalker to prison for beating up his wife years earlier. Id. The fictitious stalker's motive was a
clear case of revenge. Id.
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night."' 5 After being plagued by numerous phone calls, the woman
contacted the local, county and state authorities, as well as the FBI
asking for help.16 The woman testified that "[t]hey all looked at me
and said, '[wv]e have no idea how to help you.' '
17
In another case, Kevin Massey, who stalked a founder of a Dallas
Internet Service Provider (ISP), actually called himself the
'Cyberstalker' and lobbied to be a guest on Howard Stem's radio
show.18
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) defines stalking as:
"harassing or threatening behavior that an individual engages in
repeatedly, such as following a person, appearing at a person's home
or place of business, making harassing phone calls, leaving written
messages or objects, or vandalizing a person's property."'19 Stalking
is not a new problem; the Internet has simply provided a new and
more anonymous medium for the same old crime.20 This new crime
has been aptly labeled cyberstalking and has been defined as "use of
the Internet, e-mail or other electronic communications devices to
stalk another person through threatening behavior."'21
Using new technologies, stalkers can now reach victims in their
homes, a place where one usually feels safe. Even more disturbing,
cyberstalkers can stalk entirely from the comfort of their own home.2
Due to the ease of electronic communication, users may feel that
sending another user a potentially threatening e-mail is harmless
compared to traditional stalking. For example, an Internet user may
send a threatening e-mail to another user, not realizing the e-mail
could eventually end up in a public forum. Such a prank can lead to
harmful and humiliating consequences, as in the case of Internet user
'5 Jonathan Karl, Congress Urged to StrengthenAni-StaldngLms, Include Jntcnmit, CNN.co.M
at http:/www.cnn.comUS/9909/29Iimtemetstalldng! (Sept. 29, 1999).
161d.
17Id.
IS See Kevin Whitelaw, Fear and Dread in Cyberspace, U.S. NEWS & WVoRa REP, Nov. 4,
1996 at 50.
19 OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STALKING AND DoMFSTIc VIOL;cE,
THIRD ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN Acr 5 (1998).
2 Jessiea Laughren, Cyberstalldng Awareness and Education, at
http.//www.acs.ucalgary.ca/-dabrent/3801webprojjessica.html (last visited Oct. 31, 1999).
21 Sunny Sea Gold, VP. Al Gore Visits SDSU, THE DAILY AZTEC, at
http/'/www.dailyaztee.comArhive(Fal-1999109-20city/CityOl.tml (Sept. 20, 1999).
SWhyDoes Cyber-Stalking Occur as Often as it Does?, CYBERANGELS.ORt, at
htt'vl/www.cyberangels.org/stalking/often.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2000) ("Cyberstalking is
also much easier to practice than IRL stalking-in cyberspace a stalker can harass their target
without ever having to leave the comfort of their own home.").
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Bryan Winter.23 Winter "wrote the archetypically arrogant male
brushoff e-mail, setting off a firestorm of urban myth and electronic
revenge."2 4 He sent a degrading e-mail to a woman he had met in a
bar, arrogantly rejecting her desire to meet with him again. Seeking
revenge, the woman forwarded the e-mail to all of her friends.
26
Ultimately, Winter's seemingly private message became a very public
chain e-mail that can now be found on at least one website
27
Despite this new medium, most states do not have anti-stalking
laws that explicitly cover cyberstalking.28 The law in California,
which was used in the prosecution of Dellapenta 2 9 was only recently
amended with language to cover cyberstalking.3°
Most articles addressing cyberstalking focus on actions taken via
e-mail, a one-on-one private forum. This comment will focus on
cyberstalking conducted in public forums, rather than personal e-mail.
Part II provides a background of traditional anti-stalking laws and the
evolution of cyberstalking law. The California Penal Code currently
provides a traditional anti-stalking law, which technically includes
cyberstalking.3'
Part IH discusses how the traditional anti-stalking laws should be
modified to accommodate activity on the Internet. Specifically, Part
II focuses on the meaning of a credible threat requirement32 found in
modem anti-stalking laws, and proposes that such a requirement be
eliminated. The credible threat requirement is outdated because the
Internet allows a cyberstalker to maintain physical distance whereas
traditional stalking necessarily involved contact between the stalker
and the intended victim.
23 Gentry Lane, The Humiliation Of Bryan Winter, at
http://www.salon.comlhealthlsexlurgeJl99910511/bryan..winter/(last visited Nov, 29,2000).
24 See id.
21 See id.
21 See id.
2' See id.
2 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, 1999 Report on Cyberstalking: A New Challenge .for Law
Enforcement and Industry, at http:lwwv.usdoj.gov/Criminalcybercrime/cyberstatking.htm (last
visited Nov. 28, 1999).
29 See Greg Miller, Man Pleads Guilty to Using Net to Solicit Rape, Los ANOIGLES TIfms, Apr.
29, 1999 at C5.
30 See id. See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000).
"' See § 646.9.
32 According to the cyberstalldng watch group Cyberangels, "(o]ne interesting aspect of
Credible Threat is that if you are threatened online, you have no way of knowing if the person
can carry it out or not." Policy Concerns About Cyberspace Stalking, CY1-ERANOELSORO at
http://wvw.cyberangels.org/stalking/law.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2000).
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Finally, Part IV concludes by briefly considering ISP vicarious
liability for cyberstalkers, in both the civil and criminal contexts. In
the civil context, Congress has provided immunity for ISPs in most
cases. This comment asserts that such immunity will likely extend to
cyberstalking issues. In the criminal context, this comment contends
that ISPs simply lack the requisite intent element required for the
crime. Therefore, this article argues that a cyberstalker's ISP should
not be held liable for its subscriber's actions.
II. BACKGROUND
Make nio mistake: this ind of harassment can be as frightening
and as real as behigfollowed and watched in your neighborhood
or in your home. -Vice President Al Gore
33 "
On July 18, 1989, Robert John Bardo shot and killed actress
Rebecca Schaeffer in broad daylight.34  Bardo used computer
databases to find out her telephone number, where she lived, whom
she called, the kind of car she drove and where she shopped. 5 In this
highly publicized stalking case, Bardo used the computer to find
information on Schaeffer long before the Internet had become
popular.
3 6
Shaeffer's murder brought about a heightened awareness of the
problems involved when applying traditional anti-stalking laws to
cyberstaling. In response, the California Legislature enacted Penal
Code Section 646.9, a criminal anti-stalking law that provides in
relevant part:
(a) Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows
or harasses another person and who makes a credible threat with
the intent to place that person in reasonable fear for his or her
safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family, is guilty of the
crime of stalldng.
37
In the recent California case of People v. Borrelli, the Court of
Appeal articulated a test for identifying violations under Section
646.9:
3 1999 Report on Cyberstalking, supra note 28.
3' Laughren, supra note 20.
3 5 id.
' Id. ("Bardo may have been physically distanced from his obsession but the computer
electronically made him feel near to her.").
37 CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000) (emphasis added).
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In order to be penalized under section 646.9, subdivision (a), the
defendant must willfully engage in the prohibited conduct with the
intention of inflicting substantial emotional distress on the person
to whom the comments were directed in violation of the latter's
constitutionally guaranteed rights to pursue safety, happiness, and
privacy as guaranteed by our state and federal constitutions; the
threats must be made with the apparent ability to carry them out so
as to cause the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably
fear for his or her safety; and the victim must actually suffer
substantial emotional distress.38
When Section 646.9 was enacted, use of the Internet was not yet
popular as a public forum for communication. As such, eyberstalking
was practically unknown. Now, over 90 million people in the U.S.
have Internet access, giving stalkers a new and more anonymous
arena to perpetrate their crimes. According to the DOJ, "[g]iven the
enormous amount of personal information available through the
Internet, a cyberstalker can easily locate private information about a
potential victim with a few mouse clicks or key strokes. 39 The
Information Age has evolved since Schaeffer's murder and now
stalkers can commit crimes on-line in a way that Bardo could only
imagine.
Cyberstalking is specifically defined as "the use of the Internet, e-
mail, or other electronic communications devices to stalk another
person."40 Cyberstalking can arise in two different forms: "(1) online
cyberstalking and harassment that stays online, and (2) online
harassment and stalking that ventures offline."41 According to the
House Judiciary Committee, "[a]lthough online harassment and
threats can take many forms, cyberstalking shares important
characteristics with offline stalking. Many stalkers-online or off-
are motivated by a desire to exert control over their victims and
engage in similar types of behavior to accomplish this end. '42 A
typical stalking situation generally involves repeated harassing or
threatening behavior, such as following a person, making harassing
phone calls, leaving written messages or objects or vandalizing a
person's property.43  For example, law enforcement officers in
California have encountered situations where victims repeatedly
38 People v. Borrelli, 77 Cal. App. 4th 703, 716 (Ct. App. 2000).
39 1999 Report on Cyberstalking, supra note 28.
40 see id.
41 Laughren, supra note 20 (emphasis added).
42 H.R. REP. No. 106-455, at 3-4 (1999).
43 1999 Report on Cyberstalking, supra note 28.
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receive the message '187' on their pagers.44 The code '187' refers to
the California Penal Code section covering homicide.4 5 Similar to
traditional stalking, cyberstalking usually involves a man stalking a
woman.
46
When the California legislature realized the need to adapt its anti-
staldng law to address the increased use of high technology, it
amended Sections 646.9(g) and (h) to encompass cyberstalking.
47
Subsections (g) and (h) were amended, "as measures designed
particularly to address any harassment or credible threats made
through electronic communications to another over the Internet or via
computer network. '48 Section 646.9 now provides:
(g) For the purposes of this section, 'credible threat' means a
verbal or Vritten threat, including that performed through the use
of an electronic communication device .... It is not necessary to
prove that the defendant had the intent to actually carry out the
threat.
(h) For purposes of this section, the term 'electronic
communication device' includes, but is not limited to, telephones,
cellular phones, computers, video recorders, fax machines, or
pagers.
4 9
This is the criminal anti-stalking law as it currently stands in
California.
Im. THE "CREDIBLE THREAT" REQUIREMENT IS OUTDATED
Dellapenta tormented his victim by posting her name and address
on several web sites, soliciting other men to rape her.50 In theory,
most would probably agree that such on-line solicitation reaching
44 Id.
4 5 CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000).
.r6 See Victim Profiles, CYBERANGELS.ORG, at http:J/wwwxvyberangcls.comstalking etim.html
(last visited Oct. 31, 1999); see also PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY TOENNES, NAIL LNSr. OF
JUSTICE CTR FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, STALKING IN AMERIcA: FLNDINGS
FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY, Apr. 1998, at 2 ("Although
stalking is a gender-neutral crime, most (78 percent) stalking victims are female and most (87
percent) stalking perpetrators are male.").
4 7 See Lisa A. Karezewski, Stalking in Cyberspace: The Expansion of California's Current Anti-
stalking Laws in the Age of the Inteniet, 30 MCGEORGE L REV. 517, 521 (1999); sce also CAL.
PENAL CODE § 646.9(g) (west 1999 & Supp. 2000).
' Karczewsld, supra note 47, at 521; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(g).
49 CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(g), (h) (emphasis added).
50 See Keating, supra note 1.
2000]
122 COMPUTER &HIGH TECHNOLOGYLAWJOURNAL [Vol.17
millions of potential users is certainly threatening. However, when
applied in practice, most state anti-stalking laws, including Section
649.6, require stalkers to make a credible or overt threat to the
victim.'
In practice, the credible threat requirement is rarely met.
Although stalking victims often experience a high level of fear,
"[1]ess than half of all stalking victims are directly threatened by their
stalkers.' 52 Thus, without an overt credible threat, law enforcement
has difficulty helping victims of stalkers. 53  According to the
Cyberangels Website, "[i]n a country where even targets of real life
stalking are still told by the Police: 'We are sorry, but we can't do
anything unless you get physically attacked,' small wonder that the
'virtual crime' of cyberstalking gets even less respect."5 4
In its report on "Stalking in America," the National Institute of
Justice Centers for Disease Control and Prevention proposes that the
"'credible threat' requirement[s] should be eliminated from the
definition of stalking in all state anti-stalking statutes."55 The credible
threat requirement creates two significant questions: First, must the
victim know of the threat as it is being made; and second, how far
does the stalker have to go to constitute a credible threat to his/her
victim?
The first obstacle in dealing with the credible threat requirement
is what ramifications does the requirement have when the victim is
unaware that the threat exists? For example, in the Dellapenta case,
the victim was unaware that Dellapenta was the source of the posted
messages.5 6 The overt behavior by the men who followed up on the
postings was surely threatening, but was Dellapenta truly threatening
her as well? If so, at what point did he cross the line? His actions
might not actually constitute a credible threat as required by Section
649.6. On the other hand, Dellapenta's actions may have created a
sI See TJADEN & THoENNEs, supra note 46, at 7.
52 Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
53 See Jessica Lloyd-Rogers, Lmv Enforcement Tries to Catch Up with Online Stalkers, SILICON
VALLEY/SAN JOSE BusiNEss JOURNAL, Oct. 24, 1997, available at
http:l/wwv.bizjoumals.comlsanjose/storiesl199711027focus2.html.
Victims should take certain steps in order for the police to effectively help them: (1) File a
police report, (2) Demand that the report be taken (3) Begin establishing a paper trail and (4)
Add every new incident to the report on file at the police station. Id.
m How Does Law Enforcement Fit in?, CYBERANGELS.oRG, at
http:/vww.cyberangels.org/stalkingliawenforce.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2000).
55 See TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 46, at 2.
56 See Keating, supra note 1.
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threat when he originally posted the messages. Alternatively, the
threat might not have surfaced until Dellapenta's victim became
aware of those postings.
Most recent California cases interpreting Section 646.9 have not
involved cyberstalking but instead have considered traditional
stalking where the victim knows that he or she is being threatened at
the time of the stalker's activity." However, in the California case
People v. Norman, the court of appeal addressed the issue of a delay
between the stalker's harassment and his victim's awareness of that
harassment.58 The Nornan court rejected the defendant's argument
that to be punishable under Section 646.9, the stalking must be
contemporaneous with the fear of threat5 9 In Norman, the traditional
celebrity-stalking situation occurred when Jonathan Norman staked
out the home of famous Hollywood director Steven Spielberg while
Spielberg and his family were out of the country.'6 At one point,
while driving by Spielberg's house, Norman showed his friend "a
photograph of Spielberg's head affixed to a photo of a naked male
body."61 Norman later told this same friend that he intended to break
into Spielberg's home and rape him.62  Norman frequented the
residence several times and was eventually apprehended by one of
Spielberg's security guards.63 While still out of the country with his
family, Spielberg was notified by the authorities that "Norman had
the names of Spielberg's wife and children in his day planner, that he
had been carrying handcuffs, duct tape and a box cutter, and that
Norman had a record of prior assaultive conduct.
' '4
-7 A brief survey of California cases brought under California Penal Code Section 646.9 turned
up the following cases: See People v. Borrelli, 77 Cal App. 4th 703, 709 (Ct. App. 2000)
(reciting the fact that Victim knew defendant had firearms and ammunitions and %%as threatened
when he called and told her "today w.as the day he was going to kill her."); see also People v.
Ewing, 76 Cal. App. 4th 199, 203-04 (Ct. App. 1999) (stating the fact that after defendant told
victim during a phone conversation, "You think you know karate, 1'll kick your ass," victim
called 911 because she was seared); see also People v. Andrews, 75 Cal. App. 4th 1173, 1175
(Ct. App. 1999) (stating that defendant left several voice mail messages, including, "if I have a
jury trial... I will never be convicted because you are.., all... mother-fuckers, the top of the
mother-fuckers," and "you are asking for fucking problems."); see also People v. Hale, 75 Cal.
App. 4th 94, 100 (Ct. App. 1999) (stating that the defendant called the victim on her cell phone
and said, "You know rm going to kill you when I see you, right?").
58 People v. Norman, 75 CaL App. 4th 1234 (Ct. App. 1999).
59 See id. at 1239.
60 See id. at 1236.
61 Id.
62Id.
'3 See id. at 1236.
64 People v. Norman, 75 Cal. App. 4th 1234, 1237 (Ct. App. 1999).
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One factor the court used in finding a threat was that "by its
current provision that stalking can occur by the use of an 'electronic
communication device,' including a computer, the statute necessarily
encompasses situations where there is a delay between the
defendant's harassment and his victim's awareness of the defendant's
conduct."65 The decision indicates that courts recognize threats at the
time they occur even if the victim does not learn of the threat until a
later time. Under such an interpretation, a stalker like Dellapenta
could be found guilty of stalking even though his victim did not see
the threatening message until well after he posted it.
The second obstacle of the credible threat requirement is the
interpretation and scope of the threat, Le., what constitutes a threat
and how far does the stalker have to go? Since Section 646.9
punishes the mere utterance of words, it has "First Amendment
implications, [and] must be narrowly directed only to truly dangerous
threats, i.e., those that sometimes are termed 'true threats.' 66 In
People v. Faick, the court interpreted the credible threat requirement
to include, "a threat which on its face and in the circumstances in
which it is made is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and
specific as to the person threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose
and imminent prospect of execution."67 However, "it is enough that
the threat causes the victim reasonably to fear for her safety ... and
that the accused makes the threat with the intent to cause the victim to
feel that fear."68
California courts are not alone in wrestling with the interpretation
of 'credible threat.' In United States v. Alkhabaz, the Sixth Circuit
interpreted the threat element from the point of view of the person
receiving the threat.69 In Alkhabaz, defendant Jacob Alkhabaz (a.k.a.
Jake Baker) posted several messages on an Internet bulletin board that
consisted of short stories about the rape, torture and murder of
women. 70 Baker had also been recounting his rape fantasies in an e-
mail exchange with another man known only as 'Gonda.'
71
In the e-mail at issue in Alkhabaz, Baker described a fantasy
involving a specific woman he knew from school, a woman known
65 Id. at 1239.
66 People v. Falck, 52 Cal. App. 4th 287, 296 (Ct. App. 1997) (quoting People v. Gudger, 29
Cal. App. 4th 310, 316 (Ct. App. 1994)).
67 Id. at 295 (citing People v. Fisher 12 Cal. App. 4th 1556, 1559 (Ct. App. 1993)).
6Id. at 297 (citing People v. Carron, 37 Cal. App. 4th 1230, 1238-1240 (Ct. App. 1995)).
69 See United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997).
70 See id. at 1493.
71 See JONATHAN WALLACE & MARK MANGAN, SEx, LAWS, AND CYBERSPACE 66 (1996),
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only as Jane Doe in the case.72 Specifically, Baker recounts in
various e-mail messages and Usenet postings different scenarios
where he rapes and mutilates Jane Doe.73 In one story, Baker and his
fictitious friend, Jerry, have broken into Jane Doe's apartment and
forced her to take off all of her clothes. 74 Baker then narrates: "As
she's fighting,... eyes wide with fear, Jerry and I strip .... Jerry
and I tie her by her long brown hair to the ceiling fan, so that she's
dangling in mid-air .... Drool and loud squeaks escape through her
gag. '75 The story then continues with the men viciously raping and
killing Jane Doe.76
Baker was indicted for five counts of violating of 18 U.S.C.
§ 875(c), which provides: "[w]hoever transmits in interstate or foreign
commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any
person or any threat to injure that person of another, shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."' "
The particular stories offered for the indictments were in the form of
private e-mail and were not available to the public on the Internet.78
When the school officials who discovered the postings showed
the stories to Jane Doe, "Doe was visibly shaken .... [She] felt
threatened."79  The threat requirement under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)
requires "proof that a reasonable person would have taken the
defendant's statement as 'a serious expression of an intention to
inflict bodily harm."' 80 However, the court seemed to gloss over this
definition and held that Baker's actions did not constitute a threat.81
According to the court, "[a]t their core, threats are tools that are
employed when one wishes to have some effect, or achieve some
72 See Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1497.
73 See id. at 1497 n.1.
74 See id.
75 United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997).
76 See id. at 1497-98.
77 18 U.S.C.A. § 875(c) (West 2000). This language is similar to that of the proposed
amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 2261A, discussed infra. Therefore, an alternative to prosecuting a
cyberstalker under the current state anti-stalking laws might be to prosecute under Section
875(c). For example, in the First Circuit case of UnitCd States %, Frccman, the defendant
pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 975(c). United States v. Freeman, 176 F.3 d 575, 575 (1 st
Cir. 1999). The Court reiterated the determination of threat under that statute as "'whether [the
defendant] should have reasonably foreseen that the statement he uttered would be taken as a
threat by those to whom it is made."' Id. at 578 (quoting United States v. Whiffen, 121 F.3d 18,
21 (1st Cir. 1997)). However, an analysis of this statute is beyond the scope of this paper.
7" See Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1493.
79 \VALLAce & MM'zGAN, supra note 71, at 68.
8'Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1494.
"See id. at 1496.
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goal, through intimidation. '3 2 The court held that to constitute a
threat under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c):
a communication must be such that a reasonable person (1) would
take the statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict
bodily harm (the mens rea) and (2) would perceive such expression
as being communicated to effect some change or achieve some
goal through intimidation (the actus reas), 3
Applying the above rule to the case, the court concluded the
private e-mail between Baker and Gonda did not contain a threat
because a reasonable person would not "perceive such
communications as being conveyed to effect some change or achieve
some goal through intimidation. '8 4 In other words, Baker's friend
was the recipient of the e-mail, and that message was sent to him as
"an attempt to foster a friendship;" it was not meant as a threat to
Gonda.8 5 The court found that since Baker did not mean for Jane Doe
to see this e-mail, she could not have been threatened by it.
The U.S. District Court in Oregon, on the other hand, has
interpreted the threat requirement in a different manner.86 In Planned
Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, the court
articulated an objective test that analyzed the threat from the
standpoint of the person making the threat:
[W]hether a reasonable person would foresee that the statement
would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates
the statement as a serious expression of intent to harm or assault..
. . [A]lleged threats should be considered in light of their entire
factual context, including the surrounding events and the reaction
of the listeners. 8
7
In Planned Parenthood, the plaintiffs brought an action for
injunctive relief and damages against anti-abortion activists.88 The
defendants had posted what they called the "Nuremberg Files" on the
Internet.8 9 This posting included dossiers on abortion doctors and
read:
2id. at 1495.
83 Id.
P4Id. at 1496.
85Id.
86 See Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 23 F. Supp .2d 1182 (D. Or.
1998).
87 Id. at 1189 (citation omitted).
s8 See id. at 1185.
"
9Seeid. at 1187.
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One of the great tragedies of the Nuremberg trials after WWII was
that complete information and documented evidence had not been
collected so many war criminals went free or were only found
guilty of minor crimes. We do not vant the same thing to happen
when the day comes to charge abortionists with their crimes. J
The court held that this type of communication was actionable as
a threat to the plaintiffs. 9
Congress responded to this evolution of cyberstalking by leaving
out the credible threat requirement from a proposed amendment to the
federal anti-stalking law. On May 19, 1999, Representative Sue W.
Kelley of New York introduced The Stalking Prevention and Victim
Protection Act of 1999 (H.R. 1869) to the House of Representatives.9 2
The House passed the measure.93 If passed by the Senate and signed
into law by the President, the measure would amend the federal anti-
stalking statute (18 U.S.C. § 2261A) to read, in relevant part:
(b) For purposes of this section, a person stalks an individual if that
person engages in conduct-
(1) with the intent to injure or harass the individual; and
(2) that places the individual in reasonable fear of the death of,
or serious bodily injury (as defined for the purposes of section
2119) to, that individual, a member of that individual's
immediate family (as defined in section 115), or that
individual's intimate partner.
94
A major catalyst for this amendment was the rise of
cyberstalking. 95  During the debate on the House floor, California
9 Id. at 1187-88.
9, Id. at 1194.
9
-.See 145 CONG. REc. E1028-03 (May 19, 1999), 1999 WL 317779.
93 See iR. 1869, 106th Cong. (1999). HL.L 1869 was passed by the House of Representatives
on November 10, 1999, and sent to the Senate the same day. 145 CONG. REC. HI 1910-01 (Nov.
10, 1999) (statement of Rep. Bachus), 1999 WL 1020606.
94 See H.tL 1869. The current law provides in relevant part:
Whoever travels across a State line or within the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States with the intent to injure or harass another person,
and in the course of, or as a result of, such travel places that person in reasonable
fear of the death of, or serious bodily injury ... to, that person or a member of
that person's immediate family... shall be punished ....
18 U.S.C.A. § 2261A (West Supp. 2000).
9- Representative Kelley's findings were based in part on a report generated by the Department
of Justice on cyberstalking which had made the following recommendations:
States should review their laws to determine whether they address c)-berstalking
and if not, expand the laws to do so. Federal law should be amended to prohibit
the transmission of any communication in interstate or foreign commerce %%ith
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Representative Edward Royce stated, "these are instances where these
individuals let their intent be known. They publish their threats
against these victims. There is no reason why we cannot let law
enforcement act upon those threats before it is too late, before these
victims lose their lives. 96
The purpose and summary section of H.R. 1869 notes that it will
make several significant changes or additions to current law.97 One
such change is that "it would expand federal jurisdiction over stalking
to reach stalkers who use the mail or any facility in interstate or
foreign commerce to stalk their victims." 98  In other words, a
cyberstalker could be federally prosecuted when he or she used the
Internet to stalk because the Internet instantaneously crosses interstate
lines.
More importantly, as stated above, H.R. 1869 does not have
language requiring a credible threat. Instead, the measure requires
"intent to injure or harass the individual.., that places the individual
in reasonable fear of the death of, or serious bodily injury."99 When
introducing H.R. 1869, Representative Kelly stated, "by criminalizing
'threatening behavior' as opposed to 'the demonstration of specific
threats' this bill closes a loophole commonly used by accused stalkers
to avoid conviction."100
The language proposed in H.R. 1869 would solve the timing
issues as applied to Dellapenta's case because it does not require that
victims ever know why their attackers are showing up or the contents
of Dellapenta's communication on the Internet. Subsection (1) of
H.R. 1869 was satisfied when Dellapenta posted the messages in an
effort to hurt his victim and subsection (2) was satisfied when, as
result of his posting, Dellapenta's victim was placed in fear of bodily
injury each time a man came to her home to rape her. Moreover, H.R.
1869 solves the second obstacle of credible threat by completely
eliminating the requirement altogether.
Still, as noted by Representative Spencer Bachus during the
debate, "the vast majority of stalking cases are, and even after this
intent to threaten or harass another person where such communication places that
person in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury ....
H.R. REP. NO. 106-455 (Nov. 5, 1999).
96 145 CONG. REc. Hi 1910-01 (Nov. 10, 1999) (statement of Rep. Royce), 1999 WL 1020606.
9 H.R. REP. No. 106-455.
99Id.
99 H.R. 1869.
100 145 CONG. REc. E1028-03 (May 19, 1999) (statement of Rep. Kelly), 1999 WL 317779.
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legislation passes, vill be prosecuted at the State and local level."'0'
Therefore, it is up to individual states to provide language that will
protect potential victims. The DOJ has been working on a Model
Antistalking Code for the States. 0 2 This Model explicitly eliminates
the credible threat requirement.103 According to the DOJ:
Stalking defendants often will not threaten their victims verbally or
in writing but will instead engage in conduct which, taken in
context, would cause a reasonable person fear. The model code is
intended to apply such 'threats by implied conduct.' Therefore, the
'credible threat' language, which might be construed as requiring
an actual verbal or written threat, was not used in the model
code. 1' 4
By eliminating the need for a credible threat, the Model
Antistalking Code makes prosecuting a cyberstalker more
manageable. Therefore, the California legislature should amend
Penal Code Section 646.9 with language similar to the Model
Antistalking Code to make it clear to cyberstalkers, and to the courts,
that any threatening behavior will not be tolerated.
IV. ISPS SHOULD NOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR SUBSCRIBER'S ACTIONS
One major ISP receives approximatey 15 complaints per month of
cyberstalking, in comparison to virtually no complaints of
cyberstalkingjust one or two years ago. 0s
Arguably, the next step in the evolution of cyberstalking might be
to hold a cyberstalker's ISP liable for allowing its subscriber to harass
and stalk others. For example, ISP liability may arise from a real-life
cyberstalking incident that resulted in the death of the stalker's
target., 6 On October 15, 1999, Liam Youens walked into a dentist's
office, shot and killed Amy Boyer, then turned the gun on himself' 7
In what appears to be a typical cyberstalking incident, Youens used
the Internet to find information about his victim and then dedicated an
"' 145 Co\NG. REc. HI 1910-01 (Nov. 10, 1999) (statement of Rep. Bachus), 1999 WVL 1020606.
102 NAT'L INsT. OF JusTicE, U.S. DEP'r OF JUSTICE, DoMEmSTc VIOLENcE, STALG, AND
ANTISTALKING LEGISLATION, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, APP. B (Mar. 1996), available
at http//www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ocpal94Guides/DomVioltappendb.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 1999).
103 See id.
104 id.
10 1999 Report on Cybestalking, supra note 28, at 6.
'06 See KillerPlotted Murder Through Internet, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 30, 1999, at A12.
107 See id.
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entire web site to an on-line chronicle of his obsession with Boyer."'
According to the San Francisco Chronicle, "Youens' thoughts and
plans are detailed in a police report drawn partly from the web sites
where he debated with himself whether to kill Boyer, kill another
former classmate or storm into Nashua High School and kill as many
people as he could."'' 9 A detailed excerpt from Youens' web site
revealed, "[iln the last 4 years I have had 3 or 4 dreams about Amy,
but in the last month I've dreamt about her every single night ....
The last dream I had Amy was pregnant, so I stabed [sic] the fetus
through her, then cut her throat."' 0 In addition to devoting his web
site to an obsession with Boyer, Youens also used Internet search
agencies to find her social security number and her address."'
In the aftermath of this incident Boyer's stepfather considered
filing a lawsuit against one of Youens' ISPs, a company called
Tripod." 2 Pursuant to an inquiry, a Tripod official stated that "almost
no one visited Youens' site and that the company would have told the
police had it known about the site."'" 3 Once law enforcement notified
Tripod of the situation, the ISP took Youens' site off-line. 114 In a case
like Boyer's where the cyberstalker makes Internet postings available
to the public, a stalking victim might be inclined to sue the
cyberstalker's ISP on the theory it should have known about the site
and should have prevented its subscriber from maintaining such a site.
However, Congress provides ISPs immunity from civil liability in
47 U.S.C. § 230(c), which provides in relevant part:
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker. No provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.
(2) Civil liability. No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be held liable on account of- (A) any action
voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of
material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally
108 See id.
1O9Id.
110 J.M. Hirsch, Chilling Web Site Reveals a Killer's Obsessive Plans, L.A. TIMES, Dcc. 5, 1999
at Al.
I11 Id
112 See Killer Plotted Murder Through Internet, supra note 106.
13id.
114 see id.
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protected; or (B) any action taken to enable or make available to
information content providers or others the technical means to
restrict access to material described in paragraph (1). 1s
The ISP immunity provided by 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) is generally
applied in cases involving defamation, libel and slander causes of
action 1 6  Moreover, Congress explicitly provides in Section
230(e)(1) that this immunity will not necessarily apply in criminal
cases. 117  Therefore, while the immunity provided by Section 230
protects ISPs from civil liability, protection from criminal liability
remains unclear.
The Fourth Circuit addressed ISP civil liability under Section 230
in Zeran v. America Online, Inc., refusing to extend liability to
American Online (AOL) for the actions of its subscriber."1 In Zeran,
Plaintiff Kenneth Zeran brought a civil action against AOL alleging
that AOL "unreasonably delayed in removing defamatory messages
posted by an unidentified third party, refused to post retractions of
those messages, and failed to screen for similar postings
thereafter."'" 9 At that time, an earlier version of federal immunity for
ISPs existed, similar to the current Section 230.120
In Zeran, another Internet user had posted a message on an AOL
bulletin board falsely claiming Zeran was selling shirts that featured
"offensive and tasteless slogans" relating to the Federal Building
bombing in Oklahoma.' 2' The posting included Zeran's home phone
number.122 As a result of the posting, Zeran received numerous death
threats.' 23 Zeran repeatedly notified AOL of this inaccurate posting,
and asked that the posting be removed.124 Somehow a posting with
"5 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(c) (West Supp. 2000).
116 See, ag., Lunney v. Prodigy Services Co., 723 N.E.2d 539, 543 (N.Y. 1999); Zeran v. Am.
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
"7 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(e)(1) (West Supp. 2000). This subsection specifically provides,
"Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the enforcement of section 223 or 231 of
this title, chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110 (relating to sexual exploitation of children) of
Title 18, or any other Federal criminal statute." Id.
"
8 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 327.
119 Id
120 The portion of 47 U.S.C. § 230 relevant to this issue had identical language to the current
Section 230: "No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider." 47
U.S.C.A § 230(c)(1) (West Supp. 2000).
12' See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329.
22 See id.
123 See id.
124 See id.
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his phone number remained on the AOL bulletin board and he
continued to receive threatening phone calls. 125 In this case, AOL
clearly knew about the problem and even assured Zeran the
perpetrator's account would be closed. 126 However, the court still did
not find AOL liable because Congress shielded ISPs from liability
under the Communications Decency Act of 1996.127
Zeran is a typical defamation case brought against an ISP and,
therefore, may be distinguished from a case wherein the subscriber
takes on the identity of another Internet user. For example, an ISP
might know that one of its subscribers runs a site on which many
people post sexual fantasies. Depending on the nature of the fantasy,
when the person posting the message is the person who has the
fantasy this situation might not be a problem. 28 The problem arises
when an Internet user takes on someone else's identity, such as when
Dellapenta posted messages posing as his victim. 129 When testifying
before Congress regarding Dellapenta, Deputy Attorney General Eric
Holder stated:
Current federal law does not address those situations where a
cyberstalker uses unwitting third parties to bombard a victim with
messages, transmits personal data about a person-such as the
route by which the victim's children walk to school-in order to
place such person or his family in fear of injury, or send an e-mail
or other communications under someone else's name with the
intent to abuse, harass, or threaten that person. 1
30
The DOJ report on cyberstalking also discusses this situation:
[A] cyberstalker can dupe other Internet users into harassing or
threatening a victim by utilizing Internet bulletin boards or chat
rooms. For example, a stalker may post a controversial or enticing
message on the board under the name, phone number, or e-mail
address of the victim, resulting in subsequent responses being sent
to the victim. Each message-whether from the actual cyberstalker
or others-will have the intended effect on the victim, but the
cyberstalker's effort is minimal and the lack of direct contact
between the cyberstalker and the victim can make it difficult for
125See id.
126see id.
127 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327,329 (4th Cir. 1997).
128 However, a situation similar to the Jake Baker case discussed in Part Mll, would pose the
typical cyberstalking problem. See United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F,3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997).
129 See Keating, supra note 1.
130 Cyberattack Investigation: Congressional Testimony, Feb. 29, 1999, 2000 WL 11068569
(testimony of Deputy Att'y. Gen., Eric Holder).
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Iawv enforcement to identify, locate, and arrest the offender.131
Considering these potential problems, should the ISP require
some sort of consent from those participating, in case the posting is
not what it seems? Should the ISP then be liable if it does not get that
consent?
The New York Court of Appeals considered liability of an ISP for
the actions of a subscriber in such a case.132 In Lunney v. Prodigy
Services Company, the plaintiff alleged that his ISP (Prodigy) was
negligent because it did not employ safeguards to prevent an imposter
from opening on-line accounts in the plaintiff's name.133 An imposter
had opened an on-line account in the name of Plaintiff Alexander
Lunney and had used that account to post vulgar messages on a
Prodigy bulletin board. 34  The court noted that electronic bulletin
boards pose "more complicated legal questions" than e-mail
communication; therefore operators have a greater level of
cognizance over them.1
35
The court first held that Prodigy was not a publisher in this
situation. 36 The court then addressed Lunney's allegation that the
ISP failed to prevent the imposter from opening the account.
37
According to the court, "[Plaintiff] would require an ISP to employ a
'process for verification of the bona fides' of all applicants and any
credit cards they offer so as to protect against defamatory acts."
1 3S
The defendant ISP argued that such a duty "would require an ISP to
perform investigations on millions of potential subscribers, so as to be
guarantors against harmful transmissions.,' 39  The court agreed,
stating:
[t]he rule plaintiff advocates would, in cases such as this, open an
ISP to liability for the wrongful acts of countless potential
tortfeasors committed against countless potential victims. There is
131 1999 Report on Cyberstalking, supra note 28.
32 Lunney v. Prodigy Services Co., 723 N.E.2d 539 (N.Y. 1999).
133 See id.
3 see id.
135 Id. at 542 ('In many respects, an ISP bulletin board may serve much the same purpose as its
ancestral version, but uses electronics in place of plywood and thumbtacks. Some clectronic
bulletin boards post messages instantly and automatically, others briefly delay posting so as not
to become 'chat rooms,' while still others significantly delay posting to allow their operators an
opportunity to edit the message or refuse posting altogether.").
136 1d.
137 Id. at 543.
13 Lunney v. Prodigy Services Co., 723 N.E.2d 539, 543 (N.Y. 1999).
139 Id.
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no justification for such a limitless field of liability. If
circumstances could be imagined in which an ISP would be liable
for consequences that flow from the opening of false accounts,
they do not present themselves here.
140
The Sixth Circuit addressed another situation wherein an imposter
took on the identity of someone else in a print publishing context in
Ashby v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.141 In Ashby, Plaintiff Ursula Ashby
brought an action for libel and invasion of privacy against defendant
Hustler Magazine alleging that "the publication of her nude
photograph in the magazine without her consent caused her to suffer
severe emotional distress with resulting physiological
consequences.'42 Ashby alleged that another woman had stolen nude
pictures of Ashby, which had been taken for her private use.143 In
February 1981 Hustler received those pictures of Ashby from a
woman claiming to be Ashby, along with a signed consent form. 4 A
representative from Hustler called the woman who had sent the
picture to verify she was in fact Ashby (the woman in the picture). 45
After seemingly verifying the identity of the woman, Hustler mailed
her fifty dollars for the picture and published it in the June 1981 issue
of Hustler.146
The Sixth Circuit court found Hustler liable, in part, because
"Hustler's verification procedures were not, in any way, calculated to
ensure that the person who had mailed the photograph and executed
the release form was indeed the individual depicted in the sexually
explicit photograph."' 47 A factor in the court's decision was that
since Hustler is known as a "tasteless and offensive" magazine, it had
a higher duty of care.1 48 While the Ashby example is not directly on
point, it shows how a court may treat a situation that involves an
Internet web site posting fantasies as described above.
Despite the immunity offered through Section 230, there may be
another way to hold the ISP liable for the actions of its subscribers.
According to the DOJ report on cyberstalking, "[ISPs] almost
140 Id. (citation omitted).
141 Ashby v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 802 F.2d 856 (6th Cir. 1986).
141 Id. at 858.
143 See id. at 857.
'"4See id.
145 See id.
' Id. at 858.
147 Ashby v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 802 F.2d 856, 859 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Wood v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984).
148Ashby, 802 F.2d at 858-59.
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uniformly have provisions in their online agreements specifically
prohibiting abusive or harassing conduct through their service and
providing that violations of the policy will result in termination of the
account."' 149 This type of a subscriber agreement works in theory, but
realistically, ISPs are not actually capable of sifting through the
thousands of new web sites that pop up on the Internet every day in
order to discover violations. Once a subscriber sets up a web site, it
can be readily modified at a moment's notice.
Since web sites can be modified frequently, ISPs do not have the
resources to perpetually monitor the content of subscriber's web sites.
Moreover, the courts consider ISPs analogous to telephone
companies, immune from the content they deliver; therefore, "it is
unlikely that they [ISPs] will have the incentive to monitor private e-
mail."'150 With current technology, ISPs are just not equipped to read
every message that passes through their systems. Should an ISP that
knows about a certain questionable web site be held responsible for
checking the site periodically to verify it is not breaking any laws?
Since updating a web site can happen almost instantaneously,
continuous monitoring is just not a reasonable option at this time.
Therefore, at this point, ISPs should not be held civilly liable for their
subscriber's actions.
However, in an ironic case regarding ISP liability, a defendant
tried to blame AOL for enabling him to commit offensive acts
because of the "anonymous availability provided by AOL
chatrooms."' 5' During Defendant Mottos' sentencing hearing, he
argued that AOL is totally immune and is aware of the "garbage" that
goes through cyberspace and "snares the Paul Mottos of the world."15 2
He frther argued, "[AOL] could shut down its vile chat rooms with
the flick of a switch but with immunity and swollen cash registers it
allows weak people to get ever weaker in their [sic] privacy of their
home."153 The court rejected this argument, stating:
It is equally difficult to see how AOL's role as 'enabler' should
even be a mitigating factor within the applicable sentencing range.
As we would not mitigate the sentence of another sex offender
who, say, read with interest The Story of 0 or The Story of
Juliette, so ve do not mitigate in Motto's case because of the
149 1999 Report on Cyberstalking, supra note 28.
"0 David K. McGraw, Sexual Harassment in Cyberspace: The Problem of Unwelcome E.mail,
21 RUTGERS ComPUTER & TECH. .. 491,504 (1995).
m" United States v. Motto, 70 F. Supp. 2d 570, 572 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
'
521 Id. at 572-73 n.2.
1
5 3 id.
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presence of a business whose work is considerably more chaste
than that of Paulino Reage or the Marquis De Sade. AOL's role, if
any, as 'enabler' is therefore of no sentencing moment.1 4
Finally, cyberstalking does not just involve a man stalking a
woman in a state of obsession. Cyberstalking has opened the door for
stalkers to use the Internet to intimidate their victims by using the
services provided through the Internet. For example, one cyberstalker
terrorized Skip Press, an author whose works are sold by
Amazon.com, by posting nasty messages on Amazon's comment page
about Press' book. 155 This cyberstalker sent Press e-mail messages
alleging that the Attorney General of Washington was investigating
Press for posting these bogus reviews himself.'5 6 Press now has a
web site detailing his struggles with the ISPs and content providers to
remove the incorrect comments:
Amazon.com did not respond to my e-mail of explanation.
Instead, it made things worse, pulling down all the positive reviews
that came in from my friends, taking down my Author Comments,
and leaving the bogus bad 'reviews' up for all to see. . . . I called
its legal department.
I also made phone calls to America Online public relations (some
of the nasty posts originated from AOL, it seemed), Earthlink, and
other places. I got quick results, using the phone: Earthlink (my
ISP) was its usual Johnny-on-the-spot about handling abuses to
customers. A technical specialist researched it and assured me the
'troll' was not originating on Earthlink, even though he made it
appear that way.
AOL PR people told me that I was not a subscriber, and therefore
it could not offer much assistance. If I wanted information about
any AOL member, I would have to subpoena AOL. (This is why
there are newsgroups like aol.sucks.) I17
Press ends his web site with a warning: "If you get cyberstalked,
you'll need cunning, real-life solutions, and friends to combat it. Just
don't expect the authorities to rush to your aid; they have too much
else to do. For that to change, someone will probably have to die at
the hands of a cyberstalker."
58
s4 Id. at 579.
155 Skip Press, Fighting Cyberstalking, COMPUTEREDGE ONLINE, at
http://members.tripod.com/cyberstalked/skippress.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2000).
156 See id.
157 id.
158 Id.
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Stalking is not the only crime that happens in eyberspace. For
example, an "online system can be used in the planning or execution
of almost any imaginable crime: drug dealing; pornography
operations; robberies and burglaries; illegal transfer of inside
information on stocks; bribery and graft; gambling; fraud;
embezzlement; violating export regulations; the list goes on and
on."'1 59  However, many of these crimes, especially stalking,
traditionally require evidence of intent to commit the crime.1' In the
context of a cyberstalking situation, does the knowledge of the
material really matter if the ISP does not intend for the victim to be
fearful? Without the intent to injure or harass elements required by
stalking, there simply is no crime. Therefore, an ISP should not be
held criminally liable for the actions of its subscriber, unless it clearly
knows about the stalking activity and allows it continue.
V. CONCLUSION
The Internet is not only a new medium; it is a new frontier. The
advantages of this new communication medium are numerous. Now,
people can express themselves in ways unimaginable just decades
ago. This technology is the first step toward truly anonymous
communication. The practical effects of freedom of speech, freedom
of association and freedom from the body have never been so
accessible.
The new freedoms afforded by the Internet also bring risks of
abuse. The Internet has offered sick-minded people a new arena to
prey on innocent victims. Therefore, the anti-stalking laws should be
adapted to provide victims a means for fighting this dangerous and
senseless activity on the Internet. Specifically, the requirement of a
credible threat should be eliminated from current anti-stalking laws.
However, there seems to be no reason why an ISP should incur
liability for activities of its subscribers, unless the ISP actually knows
that the crime is being committed. The ISP should not be held liable
if someone decides to abuse access to the Internet. Cyberstalkers like
Dellapenta and Jake Baker alone are to blame and they alone should
be punished for their crimes.
159 LmCE ROSE, NETLAWv: YOUR RIGHTS IN THE ONLINE WORLD 202 (1995).
'60 See, e-g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000) CrAny person who willfully,
maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person and who makes a credible thret
with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or
her immediate family, is guilty of the crime of stalking.") (emphasis added).
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